The Protest Will Not Be Televised—It will be Decentralised
Around the world, activists are creating communication networks that can survive government censorship and shutdowns. When authorities cut off the internet, the outcome increasingly depends on who controls these networks—and today, governments are no longer the only actors in control.
From Kathmandu to Tehran, protesters have been developing alternative ways to communicate that withstand blackouts, censorship and surveillance. Ten years ago, these tools were niche, today, they are essential for organizing, funding and sustaining movements.
In September 2025, Nepal blocked 26 major social media platforms—including Facebook, WhatsApp, YouTube, X, Reddit and Signal—after the platforms did not comply with new registration rules. The government said the ban aimed to reduce unrest among young people frustrated by corruption, unemployment and political stagnation. Despite the restrictions, Nepal’s Gen Z protesters demonstrated impressive digital skills. Some groups even used Discord to debate and select their preferred prime minister, bypassing traditional channels and organizing entirely online.

Chris Jenkins, Director at the Pocket Network Foundation—which supports one of the world’s largest decentralized API protocols, processing billions of relays each day—told Newsweek, “This is a powerful example of how decentralized, permissionless systems can resist censorship by even the most influential organizations.”
Jenkins emphasized Discord’s flexibility, “Discord allows for quick creation of anonymous communities, which are difficult to track at scale. You’d have to actively disable broad communications platforms, which takes down legitimate traffic, or run disruptive radio jamming systems that break legitimate device usage.”
As Gil Scott-Heron famously said, “The Revolution Will Not Be Televised.” Today, this idea takes on a new meaning. Modern protests are often invisible to mainstream media and operate through mesh, encrypted networks that governments find difficult to control or shut down.
United States: 50501 Movement
A powerful U.S. example occurred on April 19, 2025, when the “50501” movement organized over 700 simultaneous protests across all 50 states. Participants coordinated through Reddit, Mastodon, QR codes, and peer-to-peer channels to stage marches, teach-ins, and community clean-ups opposing Trump-era policies, including aggressive immigration enforcement and federal workforce reductions.
Unlike earlier mass mobilizations, the 50501 movement relied on a constellation of decentralized channels. Authorities attempting to track or disrupt the protests faced a “hydra of communication” (a system where removing one communication node leads to multiple new connections emerging), making centralized shutdowns ineffective.
Platforms such as Pocket Network support essential messaging and transactions, ensuring key operations continue despite service interruptions. Jenkins explained, “Running a Signal proxy (a system that forwards encrypted messages through a distributed network to keep chats active) on Pocket Network allows your organization to keep chat running when the core service has been disabled. Because these protocols are not controlled by any single entity, they stay online as long as a few nodes globally are capable of maintaining the service, and they are so geographically diversified that it’s incredibly difficult to target them effectively.”
Madagascar: Mesh Networks for Survival
In Madagascar, protesters adapted to government-imposed communication restrictions by using Bitchat, a Bluetooth-based mesh network. Messages hopped directly between devices, bypassing the internet entirely. Jenkins described the approach as “security through obscurity,” allowing protesters to hide tightly coordinated communications among mainstream traffic in plain sight.
Jenkins observes that Bitchat demonstrates how decentralized communication platforms can operate on everyday personal devices, accessible even to those with limited technical expertise.
Iran: The Playbook of Digital Repression
Following Mahsa Amini’s death in 2022, Iran experienced nationwide “Woman, Life, Freedom” protests. Authorities responded with internet kill-switches, bandwidth throttling and mobile service disruptions to curb mobilization.
Activists countered by using VPNs, Tor bridges, peer-to-peer networks and even hacktivist campaigns to amplify their message internationally. These efforts highlighted a critical shift, governments are refining censorship methods with targeted, time-bound disruptions, while protesters are increasingly ready with decentralized countermeasures.

Challenges
Scaling these systems under sudden surges of demand posed its own technical challenge. “When traffic increases, so do the rewards, which stimulates additional participation organically. The beauty of decentralized systems, including DePIN projects (Decentralized Physical Infrastructure Networks, where users run nodes in exchange for incentives) is that they are often heavily incentivized by community and usage,” Jenkins said.
Despite these advantages, usability remains a challenge. Many decentralized tools still require technical knowledge or specialized setup, limiting accessibility. “Accessibility and user experience are still a challenge,” Jenkins said. “Ease of use is the number one focus for decentralized platforms who wish to be the go-to solution for maintaining core services in the face of oppressive regimes.”
Double-edged sword
While decentralised tools empower democratic movements, it also provides safe havens for extremists, misinformation networks and cybercriminals. For example, in August, far-right networks in the UK used Telegram to coordinate anti-immigration protests and spread extremist propaganda, which shows how decentralized platforms can be exploited even as they empower legitimate movements.
Decentralization also comes with inherent contradictions. For example, Discord enables decentralized-style communities but relies on Google Cloud and complies with legal requests, showing how even ‘decentralized’ platforms depend on centralized infrastructure—sometimes at odds with activists seeking true autonomy.
As Jenkins notes, free speech isn’t about protecting only agreeable voices: “Does free speech include people saying things I don’t like? Absolutely, it does, and often, that’s the kind of speech that needs to be protected more than others.”
Jenkins argues that criminal misuse cannot justify restricting legitimate technologies, “If we banned services and tools because they might be used in a crime, we’d also be banning hammers and screwdrivers and kitchen knives and cars.” His perspective reminds us that the same tools that shield activists from authoritarian control can also be vital for governments defending their own systems from attack. “Concern over illicit use of a platform cannot be a justification to impinge upon legal use,” he says.
What happens next
Future activism will increasingly rely on resilient, permissionless technologies. For organizers, understanding and adopting these tools isn’t optional—it’s essential for sustaining movements in an era of digital repression. Jenkins highlights a growing trend of crowdsourcing beyond communication—such as collecting location or mapping data or contributing to distributed file storage. By making these systems as simple to use as installing a mobile app, network-level functionality becomes something any community can actively engage in.
Jenkins also emphasizes that governments have a crucial role to play, “Governments have a job to do, and I expect they’re going to use every tool at their disposal to do it. The same stance on criminal activity also applies to government activity,” Jenkins adds, noting that even state agencies may one day depend on decentralized systems to defend against cyberattacks on their own infrastructure. This, he says, “is a feature, not a bug.” The faster the world embraces the reliability, transparency and resilience of decentralized networks, the more likely we are to secure not just free expression—but the stability of the digital world itself.